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 Taking issue with communitarianism
 COMMUNITARIANISM has risen to prominence in recent
 debates in political philosophy largely on the strength of its
 criticisms of liberalism. Among its more important criticisms
 is the charge that liberal political thinking does not properly
 appreciate the value of community. At a deeper level, communitarian
 ism asserts that liberalism is infected by confusions about the nature of
 community, thinking?mistakenly?that it is no more than an associa
 tion of separate, isolated, 'atomistic' individuals. Communitarians thus
 advance not only certain claims about value but also other claims about
 how the human world should be understood.
 My purpose here is to take issue with communitarians, and to argue
 not only that they are mistaken in the way in which they characterize
 liberalism, but also that the political philosophy in which communitari
 anism results is neither attractive nor plausible. More specifically, how
 ever, I wish to take issue with the communitarian argument that a
 superior alternative to liberalism is a form of republicanism which bet
 ter recognizes and appreciates the importance of citizenship, of patri
 otism, and of solidarity which ultimately underpins freedom. This
 argument has been developed most forcefully by Charles Taylor. I wish
 to show that this brand of communitarian republicanism not only rests
 on dubious ontological claims but also represents an ideal which is
 seriously flawed from the perspective of liberty.
 To present this argument I begin by elaborating the communitarian
 critique as it has been offered by Taylor. I then turn to criticize Taylor's
 communitarian republicanism to show why it is neither plausible nor
 as sympathetic to liberty as he claims. The final section concludes by
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 Against the communitarian republic
 reviewing some objections to this critique of the communitarian re
 public.
 Charles Taylor's case
 In an influential article, 'Cross-purposes: the liberal communitarian
 debate', Charles Taylor distinguishes two kinds of issues which have
 been run together in arguments between liberals and communitarians
 (1989: 59-82). On the one hand there are ontological issues about the
 explanation of social action and social structures, and their relation to
 individuals. On the other hand there are advocacy issues concerning
 the moral stand or policy which ought to be adopted. On ontological
 issues the major division is between atomists and holists, the former
 tending to think that social actions, structures and conditions can be
 accounted for in terms of the properties of the individuals who make
 them up (and that social goods can be accounted for in terms of com
 binations of individual goods). On advocacy issues, Taylor argues,
 there is a range of positions stretching from those which give especial
 weight to individual rights and freedoms to those which place greater
 emphasis on the good of the collective.
 Taylor has two important points to make about the significance of
 this distinction. The first is that holding to a particular ontological
 position does not amount to advocating any specific policy or moral
 stand. He makes this point in an effort to show that liberal critics of
 communitarianism neglect this distinction and so mistake description
 for advocacy. Thus, for example, Michael Sandel's influential book,
 Liberalism and the Limits ofJustice (19'82), has been mistakenly inter
 preted as a work of advocacy, recommending (among other things)
 that society become more like a family and, so, less concerned with
 justice. In fact, Taylor maintains, the principal point of Sandel's book
 is ontological: it is an effort to 'show how the different models of the
 way we live together in society?atomist and holist?are linked with
 different understandings of self and identity: "unencumbered" versus
 situated selves' (1989:160). This in itself does not amount to advocacy
 of anything in particular and liberals such as Amy Gutmann (1985), he
 says, have been wrong to criticize it for its non-existent recommenda
 tions.
 Taylor's second point, however, is that ontological claims can have a
 certain critical edge because of the way in which they define the options
 it is meaningful to support by advocacy. 'Your ontological proposition,
 if true, can show that your neighbour's favourite social order is an im
 possibility or carries a price that he or she did not count with'(1989:
 161).
 All this turns into a criticism of liberalism, in Taylor's account, be
 cause of the tendency of liberals to neglect the ontological questions
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 and to operate simply at the level of advocacy?remaining blind to
 some important issues. Liberalism, he observes,
 sees society as an association of individuals, each of whom has his or
 her conception of a good or worthwhile life, and correspondingly,
 his or her life plan. The function of society ought to be to facilitate
 these life plans, as much as possible, following some principle of
 equality ... Thus, it is argued, a liberal society should not be founded
 on any particular notion of the good life. The ethic central to a liberal
 society is an ethic of the right, rather than the good' (1989: 164).
 But once this model of liberalism is exposed to certain ontological
 issues of identity and community, its deficiencies are revealed. Indeed,
 it becomes clear that the viability of such a society is doubtful, and
 the applicability of such a formula to societies other than the United
 States highly questionable. Liberalism is both unrealistic and ethno
 centric (Taylor 1989: 165).
 That liberalism is unrealistic or unviable is evident, Taylor thinks, in its
 failure to acknowledge that society is not just a collection of individuals
 (or groups of individuals) with separate interests. For liberalism, the
 common good is constituted out of individual goods, 'without remain
 der'. But there is, in fact, more to the common good than that. The
 common good is no more a combination of separate goods than a
 conversation is a concatenation of statements. A society, if it is to
 be viable, must first be understood to be more than a collection of
 interests wielding a technology enabling the pursuit of those separate
 interests. Any attempt to maintain a society predicated on the misun
 derstanding that this is what society is would be doomed to failure.
 A better understanding of the nature of society (in other words, a
 superior ontology) is to be found in a form of republicanism (stem
 ming from the civic humanist tradition) which sees society as embody
 ing a common good of a stronger kind than the atomistic, liberal view
 allows. A republic, Taylor argues, is a society 'animated by a sense of a
 shared immediate common good' (1989:169). In it, the bonds among
 citizens are more like the bonds of friendship; and the citizen is 'at
 tached to the laws as the repository of his and others' citizen dignity'
 (1989: 169). In such a society, patriotism is important because it is
 meaningful; for the bonds of solidarity are 'based on a sense of shared
 fate, where the sharing itself is of value' (1989:170). Moreover, repub
 lican patriotism turns out to be an important bulwark of freedom. Re
 publican solidarity 'underpins freedom because it provides the
 motivation for self-imposed discipline; ... it is essential for a free re
 gime because this calls on its members to do things that mere subjects
 can avoid' (1989:170). Afree society is a society of republican patriots;
 and there can only be patriotism in a society in which citizens see them
 selves united in bonds of solidarity, sharing a commitment to a com
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 mon good which is more than merely the sum of their separate, private
 interests.
 The liberal view tends, on this account, to see citizens as defined not
 by their participation in a process of participatory self-rule but by their
 rights to equal treatment by a government obliged to take into account
 all their preferences. The ideal in such a society is not ruling and being
 ruled in turn but having clout (1989:179). This ideal, Taylor suggests,
 suffers not only from unloveliness but also from unfamiliarity. For most
 societies, with the possible exception of Britain and the United States,
 this ideal is descriptively inadequate because they have not and will not
 declare neutrality between different conceptions of the good life.
 For these reasons at least, Taylor thinks, the liberal model should be
 questioned. It is more vulnerable to the complaints of its communi
 tarian critics than it has so far been willing to admit. And it cannot get
 off the hook by appeal to the attractiveness of the ideals it advocates
 since it has not yet properly grappled with the deeper weaknesses com
 munitarians have identified in its ontological premises.
 The communitarian republic
 For a liberal to respond to Taylor's critique it is necessary to take seri
 ously the charge that liberalism rests on an implausible ontology. But
 there are two kinds of responses available; and both should be made.
 The first is to say that the liberal ontology (or at least, that which is
 alleged to be implicit in the writings of most contemporary liberal writ
 ers) is not as implausible as Taylor thinks?and also has important
 strengths. The second is to say that the links he tries to establish be
 tween the communitarian republican ontology and freedom do not
 hold?unless in ways which would give no comfort to anyone who
 values liberty.
 But both of these responses require further elaboration. To begin
 with the first, the view common to many liberals that society is best
 understood as an association made up of many individuals with sepa
 rate interests is not only plausible but also picks up an important?in
 deed, vitally important?point about the nature of society: that it is a
 field of conflict. The conflicts we find within society can only be under
 stood if we recognize that they are conflicts among individuals or
 groups of individuals. (Of course, within these groups themselves there
 are conflicts.) To be sure, in any functioning society there will be insti
 tutions which deal with conflicts among members; that is, in fact, an
 important reason for individuals to associate with one another in soci
 ety?to establish and maintain regular mechanisms for dealing with the
 conflicts which arise among them. But this does not eliminate conflict;
 it only regularizes the means of its setdement.
 None of this is inconsistent with saying that people have interests in
 common. One of the most important (and in this context, most rele
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 vant) interests they have in common is the interest in maintaining the
 settled order that is their society. Nor is it inconsistent with saying that
 there are to be found among people other kinds of bonds of associa
 tion?bonds of love or of friendship. It does not even require denying
 that humans also come together in cooperation, to pursue shared ends.
 What ought, however, to be emphasised is that society is indeed made
 up of separate individuals.
 Making such a claim does not commit one to any other theses about
 the (conceptual) priority of the individual to society or about the con
 stancy of human nature. It does, however, involve accepting that the
 point of society has to be understood in terms of the interests?or the
 good?of individuals. Aristode put the matter thus:
 Now all forms of community are like parts of the political community;
 for men journey together with a view to some particular advantage,
 and to provide something that they need for the purposes of life; and
 it is for the sake of advantage that the political community too seems
 both to have come together originally and to endure, for this is what
 legislators aim at, and they call just that which is to the common
 advantage (1980: 208).
 In all this there is no suggestion, however, that society has a point or a
 purpose (or a value) that is not in some way connected to the good of
 individuals. (If one could coherendy assert that 'there is no such thing
 as society', this is what it would mean.)
 Now, Taylor is not willing to accept this because, for him, there is
 more to society than the advantage it brings to individuals. This other
 view presented above is a misunderstanding or an error found particu
 larly in the thought of the founding thinkers of modern liberalism.
 Thus he asserts that 'Political societies in the understanding of Hobbes,
 Locke, Bentham, or the twentieth-century common sense that they
 have helped shape are established by collections of individuals to obtain
 benefits through common action that they could not secure individu
 ally. The action is collective, but the point remains individual (emphasis
 added) (Taylor 1989:166). But, Taylor continues, this sort of ontology
 has no place in the republic of patriots; for there is a common good of
 a stronger kind than such atomism allows.
 Yet it is not at all clear that there is some stronger kind of common
 good; for it is not clear that there are goods which are not ultimately
 good for individuals. Taylor thinks there are, and has tried to argue so
 at fuller length in a paper contending that some kinds of goods are
 'irreducibly social goods' (1995: 127-145). By this term he means to
 identify not merely public goods?such as dams and armies?which we
 provide collectively to secure other ends which are important, ulti
 mately, because they secure goods for individuals. The individual en
 joys security from invasion or the protection from flood damage
 (Taylor 1995: 137). But Taylor has in mind, rather, such goods as
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 community and culture which cannot be valued instrumentally in the
 way dams and armies might be.
 The dam itself, Taylor notes, is not good. Only its effects are. But,
 he insists,
 This kind of reply is not possible in regard to the culture. It is not a
 mere instrument of the individual goods. It can't be distinguished
 from them as their merely contingent condition, something they
 could in principle exist without. That makes no sense. It is essentially
 linked to what we have identified as good. Consequently, it is hard
 to see how we could deny it the tide of good, not just in some weak
 ened, instrumental sense, like the dam, but as intrinsically good. To
 say that a certain kind of heroism is good, or a certain quality of
 aesthetic experience, must be to judge the cultures in which this kind
 of heroism and that kind of experience are conceivable options as
 good cultures. If such virtue and experience are worth cultivating,
 then the cultures have to be worth fostering, not as contingent in
 struments, but for themselves (1995: 137).
 The question for us, then, comes to this: are community and culture
 intrinsic goods in the way Taylor suggests? And are human beings so
 thoroughly entangled in these goods that it makes no sense to try to
 decompose goods and valuers?
 What is confusing about this set of claims is that it is difficult to
 understand what it means for a culture or a society to be 'intrinsically'
 good. It is easy to understand what it would be for a society to be good
 (or bad) for its members. But could it be good regardless of its good
 ness for its members? Consider, for example, the society and culture of
 the aboriginal peoples living in the forests of peninsula Malaysia. It
 seems clear that their society is good for them given that, taken out of
 their communities they would probably perish?since they lack the re
 sources needed to survive in another social environment. If their soci
 ety were destroyed they would be worse off even if they survived and
 were transplanted into other communities. At the same time, their so
 ciety (their way of life) condemns them, and their children, to a much
 shorter life than that enjoyed by other Malaysians. Leaving aside the
 other virtues and vices of this society, it is clear that it is good for its
 people; but it is far from clear that it is intrinsically good. It is only
 contingendy good.
 The point here is that there is no reason why the society should not
 be valued instrumentally. For something to be valuable it must, at some
 point, be valuable to someone for the value it gives someone. It is an ill
 culture that does no one any good.
 The fact that a good like a society is collectively produced in no way
 implies that the enjoyment of it is irreducibly social. As Hardin points
 out, 'The benefit I get from my culture is my benefit even though it
 may be constituted in part by my actions and beliefs as inculcated by
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 that very culture. Just as with material goods, collective production or
 provision does not entail collective consumption' (1995: 68).
 The fact that we do not consume collectively but individually is im
 portant in reminding us that we are incorrigibly separate. This does not
 mean that there is nothing to be valued in living a life with others, in
 identifying with a community, in preferring one society to another (or
 to none). But the life lived is still, inescapably, an individual
 life?whether or not we are able to recognize it. Our embeddedness in
 a common social structure does not mean that we live the same
 lives?any more than being embedded in the same cemetery means we
 are not buried (and mourned) separately.
 The claim Taylor wishes to maintain is that the social ontology which
 is implicit in liberalism is untenable. In the end, however, it is the al
 ternative he proposes which looks to be on shakier ground. But this
 brings us only to the end of the first response to the charge brought by
 Taylor's communitarian republicanism. The next thing which has to be
 made clear is that the alleged links between the communitarian repub
 lican ontology and freedom are not as strong as has been claimed.
 The strategy Taylor pursues in the attempt to demonstrate otherwise
 is to link freedom with community, while asserting that community is
 connected with patriotism and an understanding of society as a set of
 solidaristic bonds in which one is deeply?inextricably?implicated
 and not just contingently attached. In a republican society these bonds
 are strong because, at its core, republicanism means participatory self
 rule; so patriotism will be considerable. Because patriotism has been
 and will continue to be an important bulwark of freedom, societies
 which can sustain patriotism are more likely to be free. Liberal societies,
 to the extent that they emphasise the importance of rights and proce
 dures, and value self-rule only instrumentally, will not generate patri
 otic citizens. To the extent that they do, it will be in spite of rather than
 because of liberalism.
 This argument is not persuasive, however, for at least two reasons,
 both of which have to do with the nature of society as a realm of conflict
 as well as cooperation. The first reason is that this vision of a commu
 nitarian republic rests on an unduly optimistic?if not naive?picture
 of politics. What it ignores is that reality of political power which is
 invariably wielded by rulers rather than exercised by a virtuous citi
 zenry. To be sure, it may sometimes be wielded by rulers who serve the
 good of the community and not simply their own good. But participa
 tory self-rule is a chimera.
 The second reason is that this vision of a communitarian republic
 rests on an inadequate notion of freedom. The notion is inadequate
 because, in tying freedom to self-rule? the republican model, Taylor
 says, 'defines participation in self-rule as of the essence of freedom'
 (1989: 179)?it fails to consider that often freedom resides in the ca
 pacity to resist, or even oppose rulers. In some contemporary polities
 AQ Vol. 68 No. 11996
 73
This content downloaded from 202.161.43.77 on Tue, 17 Sep 2019 05:40:49 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Against the communitarian republic
 the absence of freedom is evident in the difficulty of dissenting from
 the government line. One reason why dissenters in such a society face
 greater risks of losing their liberty is that there are no significant sources
 of independent opposition to the ruling elite that comprise the gov
 ernment. This is ensured in part by measures which impede the free
 flow of information (through licensing of the press and government
 ownership of broadcast media) and restrict the freedom to form private
 associations. But opposition is also made difficult by the existence of a
 public philosophy which maintains that the government may do what
 ever is necessary to ensure the security and unity of the polity. Oppo
 sition must therefore draw its strength not from the political process
 or the institutions of parliamentary democracy but from other sources:
 from the common law, from the personal resources of private citizens,
 from independent religious organizations, from the power of interna
 tional public opinion and the international press, and even, in some
 polities, from the monarchy.
 The point of all this is is to say that what makes for freedom is the
 possibility of opposition. 'Not unity but difference, not the modern
 state but whatever is able to maintain itself against the state, not leaders
 but the unyielding opponents of leaders, not conformity with official
 opinion but persisting criticism, are the defences of freedom' (Burn
 ham 1970: 282). In many modern societies there is as much freedom
 as there is because of the fact that criticism and opposition can make
 themselves felt, despite the many hindrances that confront the dissent
 ing voice.
 The understanding of politics and political society which underlies
 the liberal view is a more plausible one than that offered by Taylor
 because, in the end, it recognizes that conflict is as much a part of social
 life as is the cooperative concern for the common good. And if this is
 so, freedom cannot be built into the structure of the community as
 securely as defenders of the communitarian republic imagine. Free
 dom's best chance of surviving rests on the continual possibility of
 opposition to the wielders of power. Liberalism's task is to prevent
 freedom from being re-defined away.
 Answering some objections
 The arguments offered thus far do not, of course, exhaust the issues in
 this field of debate. Since many of the questions and problems tackled
 here are old ones, the communitarian challenge will not end here. Yet
 even if the debate cannot be setded conclusively, I would like to end
 by making some observations about the nature of the communitarian
 challenge by responding to two possible objections to?or complaints
 against?the views defended here.
 The first objection is that this outlook embodied here is too dismis
 sive of politics and of the value of community. Like all liberal views, it
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 forgets that when politics goes well 'we can know a good in common
 that we cannot know alone' (Sandel 1982: 181). My reply to this is to
 say that it is right to be sceptical about politics, even if it ought not to
 be despised, for it is simply a necessary activity for the protection of
 important freedoms?particularly in circumstances in which freedom
 may be threatened. Undoubtedly, engaging in political activity will on
 occasion bring success, and with it a sense of belonging and of collec
 tive achievement. But the view that this in any sense represents the
 highest?or even a particularly important?good should be seen for
 what it is: an illusion. As the philosopher Chuang Tzu put it: 'When
 the springs dry up, the fish are all together on dry land. They will
 moisten each other with their dampness and keep each other wet with
 their slime. But this is not to be compared with their forgetting each
 other in a river or a lake' (Quoted in Oakeshott's introduction to Hob
 bes n.d.).
 The second objection is a familiar one which asserts that the liberal
 view, such as that offered here, paints an unlovely as well as an implau
 sible picture of man as an isolated atom, disconnected from society and
 from others. There are two parts to the answer that might be offered
 to this question. The first is to say that, to a substantial extent, we do
 remain separate?and isolated. No matter how close we may be, we live
 different lives. Yet solitariness is not the opposite of sociality (See Oake
 shott 1993, esp. p.54). The second is to say that to assert the existence
 of humans as individuals does not mean contending that they are like
 unconnected atoms. They come into the world 'connected' (some,
 well-connected) and acquire their characteristics as individuals as the
 result of these connections. At the same time, however, individuation
 is inescapable (even though the recognition granted to individuals as
 separate beings in the community varies from society to society). To
 assert this is to say, with St Augustine, that man's separateness does not
 mean he must be bereft of all society. Indeed, what draws man into
 society is his similarity with others and his capacity for affection.1
 To assert this does not require an understanding of man which shears
 away all social characteristics to leave us with a transcendent being.
 That may be the deeper truth about man and his place in crea
 tion?leading to the conclusion that 'all the diversity of contingent
 beings abides in One alone' (Bhagavad Gita n.d.: 384). But it is a con
 clusion we need not ponder if our question is one about how contin
 gent beings can associate with one another in this world. AQ
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 Note
 1. 'And therefore God created only one single man, not, certainly that he might
 be a solitary bereft of all society, but that by this means the unity of society
 and the bond of concord might be more effectually commended to him, men
 being bound together not only by similarity of nature, but by family affection.'
 Saint Augustine (1993) The City of God, trans. Marcus Dods, The Modern
 Library, New York, Book XII, section 21: 406.
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